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I. 
INTRODUCTION 
Goodman Oil Company ("Appellant") has appealed the dismissal of the 
Respondent Scotty's Duro-Bilt Generator, Inc., ("Respondent") as a defendant in a writ 
of mandamus and judicial review proceeding brought by the Appellant against the City of 
Nampa and Respondent. The Respondent filed its Respondent's Brief raising the 
following issues that require rebuttal by Appellant: 
1. Whether the case and controversy underlining this case is moot; 
2. Whether Appellant's Notice of Appeal was timely; and, 
3. Whether the district court properly awarded attorney's fees to Respondent 
in this case. 
II. 
THIS CASE IS NOT MOOT 
An issue is moot when a favorable judicial decision would not result in any relief. 
Webb v. Webb, 143 Idaho 521, 524, 148 P.3d 1267, 1270 (2006). 
Appellant's Motion to Amend, the dismissal of which is the subject of this appeal, 
sought to bring causes of action against Respondent based upon breach of contract and 
interference with contract. Whether or not Respondent breached the Vacation Agreement 
and interfered with Appellant's contract to sell its property abutting First Avenue South is 
a matter wholly separate, legally and factually, from whether the City of Nampa had the 
authority to retroactively veto Ordinance #3374. The issues concerning breach of 
contract are not mooted by the fact that First Avenue South was eventually vacated by the 
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district court's issuance of a Writ of Mandamus commanding the publication of the 
ordinance vacating First Avenue South. Bart McKnight, President of Respondent, 
intentionally derailed the proper vacation of First Avenue South by contacting the Mayor 
of Nampa, who then illegally vetoed Ordinance No. 3374 after it had been passed. 
Respondent's conduct clearly breached the Vacation Agreement, in which the 
Respondent had agreed to cooperate in the street vacation process, and forced Appellant 
to engage in years of costly litigation to unwind the confusion directly and intentionally 
caused by Respondent. Respondent's conduct also interfered with Appellant's sale of its 
property. Appellant seeks compensation from Respondent for its wrongdoing, and this 
issue is not moot. 
Further, while it is correct that Appellant's breach of contract actions against 
Respondent and Bart McKnight were litigated in a subsequent lawsuit now pending 
before this Court on appeal (See, Supreme Court Docket No. 34797), Appellant filed its 
Motion to Consolidate in Supreme Court Docket No. 34797 seeking to consolidate that 
appeal with this case given the common questions of law and fact between them. 
Respondent opposed Appellant's Motion to Consolidate and that motion was denied 
pursuant to the initial dismissal by this Court of the appeal in Supreme Court Docket No. 
34797 on February, 7, 2008. The Appellant did not renew its Motion to Consolidate after 
the appeal in this case and the appeal in Supreme Court Docket No. 34797 were 
reinstated because of the delay already caused by the lengthy preliminary motions. 
Appellant believes the common issues between this appeal and the appeal in Supreme 
Court Docket No. 34797 can be sufficiently addressed at oral argument in this case. 
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Finally, the district court awarded the Respondent attorney's fees under the 
unreasonable and frivolous rubric set forth in LC.§ 12-121 and I.R.C.P. 54. In order for 
the Appellant to reverse this finding of attorney's fees, the Appellant must convince this 
Court that Appellant's case before the district court was not frivolous and not without 
foundation. The most obvious and expedient way to do so is to show that the district 
court's findings below were in error. The Appellant has raised the issues in this appeal of 
whether the district court erred in dismissing Respondent from the suit and in denying 
Appellant's Motion to Amend. Thus these issues are not moot. 1 
III. 
APPELLANT'S NOTICE OF APPEAL WAS TIMELY 
Respondent contends that Appellant's initial Notice of Appeal, filed on June 6, 
2007, was untimely because the Memorandum Decision on Judicial Review and Order on 
November 7, 2006, was the final order in this case that started the time for appeal to run. 
Appellant, however, contends that its appeal was timely for two reasons. 
First, the November 7, 2006, Order was not the final order. Whether an 
instrument is an appealable order or judgment must be determined by its content and 
substance and not by its title. Idaho Best, Inc. v. First Security Bank of Idaho, NA., 99 
Idaho 517, 584 P.2d 1242 (1978). As a general rule, a final judgment is an order or 
judgment that ends the lawsuit, adjudicates the subject matter of the controversy, and 
1 Indeed, logic would dictate that any award of attorney's fees that is based upon an analysis of the merits 
of the underlying issues in the case prevents those issues from becoming moot at least to the degree 
necessary to determine the propriety of the award of the attorney's fees. Otherwise, the doctrine of 
mootness could shield from review any award of attorney's fees if the underlying issues became moot. 
Certainly this is not a proposition conducive to justice or that comports with the basic concepts of fairness 
in the law. 
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represents a final determination of the rights of the parties. Davis v. Peacock, 133 Idaho 
637, 991 P.2d 362 (1999). It must be a separate document that on its face states the relief 
granted or denied. Hunting v. Clark County School Dist. No. 161, 129 Idaho 634, 931 
P.2d 628 (1997); l.R.C.P. 58(a)(2). 
The district court's November 7, 2006, Order explicitly remanded to the City of 
Nampa the issue of whether other factors concerning the "public good" existed as to why 
First Avenue South had been vacated. See Record, .pp. 110-111. The November 7, 
2006, Order did not end the case. There was still an unresolved issue in the case. l.C. § 
50-311 makes it clear that a "finding of expedience of the public good" is a condition, the 
only condition to the vacation of a city street. See, LC. § 50-311; Black v. Young, 122 
Idaho 302, 308, 834 P.2d 304, 310 (1992). Clearly, if Appellant had appealed this case 
from the November 7, 2006, Order and the City of Nampa had subsequently failed to find 
the vacation of First Avenue South expedient for the public good, the record on appeal 
would have been severely compromised and the Notice of Appeal would have likely been 
inaccurate. This Court would have been unable to properly review any issues before it. 
The district court's November 7, 2006, Order cannot be seen to have been a final order as 
it did not end the case. 
The final order in this case was the district court's April 26, 2007, Order. See 
Exhibit "A" to this Brief. The April 26, 2007, Order was entered pursuant to Appellant's 
Motion for Clarification and Motion for Reconsideration. The district court granted in 
part Appellant's Motion for Clarification and specifically limited the scope of the remand 
to the City ofNampa only to the issue of what public good supported the vacation of First 
Avenue South. Under the April 26, 2007, Order the City of Nampa could not undue the 
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vacation of First Avenue South by finding no public good existed under LC. § 50-311. 
The City of Nampa was charged with the duty to find the public good and thus complete 
the process of the vacation of First Avenue South already ordered by the district court's 
Order Granting Writ of Mandamus, filed August 8, 2005. See, R., p. 85. Indeed, the 
district court granted Appellant's Motion for Preliminary Injunction on April 27, 2007, 
preventing the City of Nampa from holding a public hearing to unwind the vacation of 
First Avenue South. Any further proceedings by the City of Nampa were thus 
perfunctory and could not and did not affect any issues raised in the subsequent Notice of 
Appeal that was entered June 6, 2007. 
In the alternative to Appellant's contention that the November 7, 2006, Order was 
not the final Order, Appellant asserts that even if that Order was the final order, 
Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Clarification filed on January 29, 
2007, was timely. Petitions for judicial review to the district court, such as the one in this 
case, are governed by l.R.C.P. 84, and motions for reconsideration under those 
procedures are set forth in l.R.C.P. 84(t)(2)(b), which provides a party with forty-two 
( 42) days to make a motion for reconsideration ( entitled therein as a motion for 
rehearing). However, the failure to meet the timelines set down in I.R.C.P. 84 are 
governed by I.R.C.P. 84(n), which states that failure to meet any deadline in a Rule 84 
proceeding, other than failure to timely file a Rule 84 petition, "shalJ not be deemed 
jurisdictional, but may be grounds only for such other action or sanction as the district 
court deems appropriate." I.R.C.P. 84(n). So even if Appellant's Motion for 
Reconsideration and Motion for Clarification were late under Rule 84, it is not automatic 
grounds for denying consideration of that motion. The district court in this case thought 
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it proper to consider these motions anyway and overruled by implication any finding they 
were untimely. 
IV. 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORJ~EY'S FEES 
AND COSTS MUST BE VA CA TED 
The Respondent claims the award of attorney's fees under LC. § 12-121 and 
LR. C.P. 54 must be upheld because the district court entered findings supporting the 
award in a hearing transcript. However, under LC. § 12-121 and LR.C.P. 54, the court 
must under LR.C.P. 54(e)(2) "make a written finding, either in the award or separate 
document, as to the basis and reasons for awarding such attorney fees." Appellant 
contends that a separate document does not include a hearing transcript. A "separate 
document" must be a written document entered into the record by the court. Further, the 
hearing transcript is not a part of the record on appeal. This Court has no basis to review 
the findings of the district court - further underscoring the point that the district court 
should have entered the relevant finding in a written document directly into the record as 
an order or decision of the court. 
V. 
CONCLUSION 
The issues in this appeal are not moot. Appellant's appeal was timely, and the 
district court's award of attorney's fees must be vacated. 
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' 
DATED this U day of July 2008. 
RUNFT & STEELE LA \V OFFICES, PLLC 
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, I u 
This matter having come for hearing on April 13, 2007, and the Court having heard 
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration and Clarification, Petitioner's Motion for 
Reconsideration of Attorney Fees and Mediation, Petitioner's Motion for Entry of Proposed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law; Proposed Judgment as to Nampa Respondents and 
ORDER, P. l Exhibit_/\ 
Proposed Preliminary Inj1U1ction as to Nampa, and Respondent City ofNampa's Motion for 
Reconsideration Regarding Attorney Fees, and the Petitioner being represented by its co1U1sel of 
record, Jon M. Steele, and the Nampa Respondents being represented by their counsel of record, 
Christopher D. Gabbert, and the Court being ful!y advised, 
DOES HEREBY ORDER the following: 
l. Nampa's Motion for Reconsideration of Attorney Fees Award on the Judicial 
Review portion of the case is DENIED. 
2. Goodman's Motion for Reconsideration of this Court's remand is DENIED. 
3. Goodman's Motion for Clarification of Remand Order is GRANTED with these 
ORDER,P. 2 
clarifications and directions: 
a. The remand is limited solely to the issue of whether Ordinance No. 3374, 
when passed by the Nampa City Council and approved by the Mayor in 
September of 2004, was expedient for the puhlic good. 
b. The issue of expedience fer the public good and the vacation of First 
A venue South are not to be treated as new issues or a new application for 
the vacation of First Avenue South. 
c. Consent of aJ] adjoining property owners to the vacation of First Avenue 
South was given prior to passage of Ordinance No. 3374 in the Property 
Owners Vacation Agreement, an original of which is found in the Nampa 
Planning Department's file on this vacation. 
d. Consent of the adjoining property owners to the vacation of First A venue 
South is not an issue to be considered or addressed in determining 
expedience of the public good. 
e. Rights-of-way, easements and franchise rights of adjoining property owners 
and utility easements, including the existing water line, are not issues to be 
considered in determining expedience of the public good as they are 
protected by the statutory reservations in Idaho Code § 50-31 t aaa 05· lhe 
cross easeffieHts set fertli iH the Property OwHer's VaeatioH AgFeeffiellt ~ 
f. The City's inability to consider or require any aeeess SF easement beyond ~ 
those provided by Idaho Code § 50-311 is not a factor to be considered in 
determining expedience of the public good. 
g. There will be no public hearing held in detennining expedience of the f c.-----
. The dete~minatio~ shall be made at an open, public 
pubhc good. The faet fina1Hgpreeess 1s elesee. meeting. Input from 
Nampa city staff is permissible 
h. The lack of reservation ofa fire apparatus access in Ordinance No. 3374 is 
not a factor to be considered in determining expedience of the public good. 
i. Whether a fire apparatus access will be addressed in the development 
process is a factor which the City may consider. 
j. The Preliminary Injunction issued by this Court on February 2, 2007, will 
remain in effect until the expedience of the public good is considered by the 
Nampa City Council. 
DA TED this~ day of April 2007. 
JUDGE JAMES C. MORFlTT 
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